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The canonical poem, The Faerie Queene, investigates the nature of six virtues 
through the adventures of individual titular heroes. The fifth book, “The Legend of Justice,” 
seems to be where Spenser’s allegory begins to break down. Two critical interpretations of 
how best to approach Book V have risen to prominence: first, as a strict historical allegory 
and the other, as a moral investigation of Spenser’s fashioning of justice. This thesis melds 
the two readings—historical and moral—through a gendered lens, arguing that the critical 
rifts of Book V are primarily as a result of pity. Specifically, pity evoked by feminine 
characters, who perplex and hinder male justicers during their quests of virtue. With male 
justicers sidelined, Spenser utilizes feminine enactors of the virtue to enact justice which 
must be governed by equity and stymied by mercy to restore natural order and remedy early 
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The Faerie Queene, first published by Edmund Spenser in 1590, and later expanded 
into its current form in 1596, has fascinated and perplexed readers for over four centuries. 
Transcendent of its age, the epic poem engages allegorical representations of private and 
public virtues, societal anxieties, and topical concerns. The Faerie Queene, to quote the poet 
John Milton is “doctrinal and exemplary to a Nation” (2). Indeed, according to one of its 
most seminal scholars and the editor of what is still the standard edition of Spenser’s work, 
A.C. Hamilton, there is no part of culture, “from religion to ethics and from philosophy to 
politics” that the poem is not relevant to, “either directly or allusively” (Hamilton, 
Introduction 1). 
 To introduce The Faerie Queene and the monumental nature of his task as a poet, 
Spenser opens the work with a letter to Sir Walter Raleigh in which he describes the work as 
“a continued allegory, or dark conceit” (1). Spenser’s original coinage of the term “dark 
conceit” defines the complex and multifaceted allegorical nature of his work. Most simply 
and transparently, The Faerie Queene functions didactically by employing a catalog of 
characters used to express a moral or political truth, often yoking Elizabethan politics to 
internal and external virtues. On the narrative level, the heroes of each book embark on 
journeys, along the way working to master six different virtues to which readers should 
aspire. The virtues—holiness, temperance, chastity, friendship, justice, and courtesy—are 
divided into the first three books which focus upon the internal virtues and the later books 
which look outside the soul. But Spenser’s conceit is not neat; it is “dark,” a word that 
Spenser poignantly uses to diagnose his largest concern about his allegorical task.  
MLA Style Manual, 8th Edition 
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For Spenser, like virtue itself, allegory must be interpreted. It cannot dictate virtue 
with a set of rules that will always work in every situation. Rather, virtue is defined by 
circumstance, making it both ideally suited to allegory and widely susceptible to 
misinterpretation. This is nowhere more true then in Spenser’s most complicated virtue, 
Justice, which he negotiates in Book V of The Faerie Queen in the form of the Knight of 
Justice, Artegall. 
Book V, or the Book of Justice, in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, is, according to 
Hamilton, the area of the allegory where “Spenser’s fiction seems to break down,” adding 
that “probably for this reason, [Book V] is the least popular” (The Structure of Allegory 170). 
The allegorical breakdown that occurs in Book V can be attributed to the difficulty of 
negotiating early modern notions of moral and historical justice. Of all the virtues, justice is 
the most problematic, in part thanks to its all-encompassing nature which comprehends all 
other virtues. Aristotle frames justice as the sum of every other virtue in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, in large part because justice extends further than the soul to encompass both the body 
and the realm (5.1.13-15). As such, Spenser’s task must expand from the other virtues to 
work to promote and fulfil human nature to include those also responsible for oppressing it. 
In other words, as Spenser’s contemporary Phillip Sidney notes in his Defense of Posey, 
justice seeks to make men good as much as a result of fear of punishment as a love of virtue. 
For Sidney, who is more cynical about the nature of justice than Spenser himself, the virtue 
must aim lower than the just soul and must content itself with creating good members of the 
commonwealth: “[justice] does not endeavor to make men good, but that their evil hurt not 
others, having no care, so he be a good citizen, how bad a man be” (24).  The dual nature of 
justice—that of acting upon the individual soul and the commonwealth at large—is what 
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brings Spenser’s allegory into contention, its interpretation pulled between both its moral and 
topical concerns. 
 Spenser’s allegory must directly contend with questions of general morality and 
particular topicality which depicts the evolving early modern legal system charged with 
administering justice across the realm. Spenser fashions the virtue of justice at a point in 
history when the relation of justice to equity and mercy was being determined and distributed 
among both common-law courts and the crown. In Elizabethan jurisprudence, according to 
Hamilton, equity existed as a “supplement to the ordinary operations of the Common Law” 
and was “institutionally embodied in the Court of Chancery,” which primarily dealt with a 
system that operated under a loose set of rules to avoid the slow pace of change and possible 
harshness of the Common Law (354). Specifically, equity finds its power in natural law 
rather than precedent, a freedom which allowed early modern justicers to make judgments on 
a case-by-case basis, particularly in the absence of a clear precedent from Common Law 
(Haigh 82). Though equity allowed for the extension of mercy where the letter of the law 
denied it, equity is not to be confused with mercy. In defining mercy in his Spenser 
Encyclopedia, Hamilton associates it exclusively with the monarch and turns to Erasmus, 
who writes “the king shows mercy in helping the oppressed, truth in judging honestly, and 
clemency in tempering the severity of the law” (qtd. in Hamilton 469). Indeed, mercy was, 
“in Tudor popular culture,” considered to be a vital aspect of sovereign power, “both a 
necessary and a legitimate adjunct to justice,” according to K.J. Kesselring, a scholar of early 
modern jurisprudence (3). Furthermore, mercy became a tool of state formation and “enabled 
Tudor sovereigns to present themselves as merciful despite an increasingly severe set of 
laws” (Kesselring 47). Early modern mercy’s extenuation of the severity of law’s punishment 
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functioned as “a performance of royalty,” an act reserved for the sovereign to be used at their 
discretion (Lake 279). Kesselring writes that “over the Tudor period, the Crown insisted on a 
greater role in dictating acceptable behavior with mercy and justice shaping the existence of 
authority” (11). The negotiation of justice within the complicated moral spectrum of equity 
and mercy thus positions the monarch as the deputy of God, an authority not unquestioned in 
early modern England with a feminine monarch on the throne. 
Given the difficulty of separating out a “perfect” justice from the corresponding 
virtues of equity and mercy, it stands to reason that Spenser’s Knight of Justice would not 
progress through the events of Book V linearly, moving from ignorance to mastery of the 
virtue. Rather, Artegall stumbles between the extremities of scorn and pity, attempting to 
work out how best to enact justice upon the bodies of others. What seems to particularly 
challenge Artegall’s progression in justice is his propensity to confuse equity, mercy, and 
pity in his administration of justice upon feminine bodies. Women who are positioned in 
moments of distress, traditionally objects of pity in Arthurian romance, are allegorized in The 
Faerie Queene into complex moral challenges that directly engage Artegall’s responses of 
scorn and pity. Munera, Radigund, and Duessa all present themselves before Artegall as 
kinds of supplicants in defeat, arriving at such supplication through very different means. 
Artegall first encounters Munera, the daughter of the villain Pollenete, early in his quest after 
he defeats her father. Munera, who receives the treasures her father steals from those he robs 
and kills when they attempt to cross his bridge, represents a kind of corruption and bribery, 
signified by her golden hands and silver feet that “sought vnrighteousnesse, and iustice sold” 
(V. ii. 26.8).  A site of “rew” to Artegall, Munera is nevertheless ruthlessly dispatched by 
Talus, the text’s representation of “justice rigorous” while Artegall silently looks on (25.9). 
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In this instance, Artegall is made passive, the execution taken over by his “yron man” (V. i. 
12.2). Next, Artegall fights Radigund, the Queen of the Amazons, who executes knights or 
enslaves them, forcing them to cross-dress and behave as women. Artegall challenges 
Radigund to single combat but when he defeats her, he pities her, once again becoming 
passive, enough so to allow Radigund to rally to defeat and imprison him, necessitating that 
he be freed later by Britomart, his love. Lastly, Artegall encounters Duessa standing trial in 
the courtroom of Mercilla for the crimes she perpetuates on the knights throughout The 
Faerie Queene. In Duessa’s trial, she is represented by Pitie and prosecuted by Zele, with 
Mercilla presiding over the verdict, Artegall and Arthur positioned to either side of her to 
represent perfect monarchical mercy.  In all of these instances of feminine interaction, 
Artegall is marginalized, moved to the side in favor of another administrator of justice, be it 
Talus, Britomart, or Mercilla.  In this thesis, I examine the places in The Faerie Queene 
where justice and the allegories of justice appear to “break down” to return to A.C. 
Hamilton’s language about Book V more generally.  It is these moments that beg for 
additional consideration which can be provided through a careful interdisciplinary approach 
that marshals literary scholarship, the emblem tradition, moral philosophy, and historical 
topicality to argue for a re-interrogation of justice as it is enacted upon feminine bodies in 
early modern England. Through a combination of these lenses, I examine the anxiety of the 
feminine associated with Spenser’s allegory of justice, an anxiety that permeates not simply 
The Faerie Queene, but also gets inflected in the period’s emblem tradition, moral 
philosophy, and royal iconography. 
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Spenser’s allegory reconstructs the icons of the emblem tradition,1 better defined by 
Jane Aptekar as “intensely visual images which are interpretations of reality in its metaphoric 
and symbolic dimensions” (3). Aptekar, whose seminal text Icons of Justice argues that the 
visual characteristics employed in The Faerie Queene are closely-aligned with well-known 
iconographical traditions, notes the influence of these Renaissance conventions. As a result, 
the verbal tapestry woven by Spenser is inspired by the rich emblem tradition in vogue in 
England at the time, informing the epic’s indebtedness to such “unstated conceptual 
signification” (Aptekar 4). Aptekar recuperates Spenser’s description from the charge that it 
is elaborate and irrelevant decoration, countering critics like Douglas Bush who write that the 
author’s metaphors are “patches stuck on rather than a growth from within” (93). Still, other 
studies have closely examined Spenser’s imagery and phraseology to argue that “most of 
Spenser’s images are the natural outcroppings of rich substrata of meaning” found in the 
visual tradition of justice emblems that open up the text’s interpretation (Aptekar 5). Aligned 
with such emblems, for example, it becomes apparent that Artegall’s maturation is deeply 
problematic, the Knight of Justice often found to be an objectionable hero and man. Aptekar 
marshals iconographical evidence to support her readings of Artegall as a deeply conflicted 
hero, yet one befitting the complicated justice of early modern England. 
Despite the persuasive power of Aptekar’s work, the emblem tradition is not a 
sufficient lens to apply to Spenser’s text in and of itself. To present a moral truth visually, an 
emblem must sacrifice historical context and circumstance, stripping away the particulars to 
                                                          
1 “Icon” in literary criticism has been chiefly influenced by the work of W.K Wimsatt, who writes: 
“The term icon is used today by semeiotic writers to refer to a verbal sign which somehow shares the properties 
of, or resembles, the objects which it denotes” (10). For a more comprehensive explanation of the term as 




embody a kind of universal. Fortunately, Spenser’s allegory is able to restore such particulars 
to Book V’s portrait of monarchical justice, its historical relevance key to recuperating 
Spenser’s “dark conceit.” According to some historical accounts, in Book V, monarchical 
rule is problematized in both nature and action: in nature through the feminine body of 
Queen Elizabeth and in action through Elizabeth’s ruinous policies in Ireland. To speak to 
the anxiety surrounding feminine rule, Spenser allegorizes the perfect monarch, Mercilla, as 
a historical representation of Queen Elizabeth I.2 Adopting an analysis that reads the book as 
an allegory for Queen Elizabeth and her enemies, Duessa functions as a historical 
representation of Mary Stuart. The relationship between the two, according to John Guy, 
“sees Elizabeth and Mary as rival queens,” adding that “the latter stood as a great, if not the 
greatest, threat to the former’s reign” (495-496). Furthering this assertion, Kerby Neil argues 
that, to Spenser, “Mary Stuart was a woman whose former nobility was sullied with the 
worse crimes”3 and her threat to Elizabeth “constituted a national danger” (212). It is through 
the quelling of such a threat in the form of Mercilla’s decision to execute Duessa, as Queen 
Elizabeth executed Mary in 1587, that Spenser’s anxieties regarding a feminine sovereign are 
remedied. Spenser finds his root in the co-option of the political theology of the King’s Two 
Bodies, in which Mercilla is able to exist as a female monarch and still expertly deliver 
justice to Duessa, as Queen Elizabeth I did. The body natural exists as the physical, corporal 
body of a monarch, while the body politic is an abstracted idea containing “mysterious forces 
                                                          
2 Nelson pursues this historical route, writing that “the governing principle of Spenser’s poems is 
intellectual and thematic rather than narrative, dramatic, or symbolic” (7). 
 
3 Neill chronicles the crimes of Mary Stuart: “She threatened the country with both civil war and 
foreign invasion; she had plotted against Elizabeth’s life and the Protestant religion; she had seduced subjects 
from their allegiance; and her private life was unspeakably vile” (212). 
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which reduce, or even remove, the imperfections of the fragile human nature” (Kantorowicz 
109). The two might be illustrated in the manner outlined below:  
 
 
On the other end of the historical allegory, many Spenserian scholars have argued that Book 
V is Spenser’s retelling of his “own political prose treatise, A View of the Present State of 
Ireland” (Aptekar 8). Hamilton echoes this sentiment, writing that The Legend of Justice 
“comes closest to Spenser’s own political experience in Ireland,” adding that the book “is 
hard-edged and uncompromising” (The Spenser Encyclopedia 356). Spenser worked as a 
colonial official in Ireland, a country where the failures of justice were apparent. Justice, in 
Spenser’s view, “as he clearly tells us through Irenius in The View of the State of Ireland, 
meant the imposition of English law on the recalcitrant Irish population” (Hamilton 355). 
Justice, in Spenser’s experience, failed utterly in Ireland, so much so that C.S. Lewis directly 
blames Spenser’s time in Ireland for the failure of Book V: “Spenser was the instrument of a 
detestable policy in Ireland, and in his fifth book, the wickedness he had shared begins to 
      Figure 1: The Body Natural vs. The Body Politic 
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corrupt his imagination” (349). Lewis’s scathing critique culminates in his assertion that 
Spenser “becomes a bad poet because he is, in certain respects, a bad man” (350). Modern 
critics, like Shelia Cavanagh, have argued that such critiques of Spenser’s attitude toward 
Ireland are too brash, writing that his “poetry illustrates the poet’s consciousness of Ireland’s 
divided nature,” adding that “book 5 makes it clear that he tried to approach the country 
pragmatically” (“Ireland in Spenser’s Prose and Poetry” 47). Cavanagh’s fresh take on 
Spenser and Ireland is punctuated by her assertion that “any hope he held for the restoration 
of the Golden Age to Ireland or to the world was secondary to his awareness of any such 
dream’s recurrent disappointment” (“Ireland in Spenser’s Prose and Poetry” 48). As one can 
see with careful examination, like an exclusively emblematic reading, a strictly historical 
reading of the allegory ignores the moral implications of the virtues being explored by 
Spenser, while a moral examination prevents the overt political implications in Book V from 
being fully fleshed out. 
Critics have put forward multiple and various critical interrogations of Book V; 
however, two common trends of scholarship rise to prominence. Both recapitulate the 
problems outlined above. The first critical trend reads the work as a strict historical allegory 
for Queen Elizabeth I and her enemies. Critics such as William Nelson argue that Spenser 
utilizes the book’s representations of feminine monarchy, Queen Mercilla, to celebrate a ruler 
whose courage and strength kept her throne secure and her nation at peace and to undercut 
the legitimacy of those who opposed her. In such a reading, feminine authority is made 
particular to Elizabeth, the singular isolated exception to the rule of patriarchy. The second 
critical trend unpacks the moral allegories of justice interrogated in Spenser’s work, looking 
to Aristotle and Seneca, as Jane Aptekar does, to explore how Spenser’s Knight of Justice 
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demonstrates early modern conceptions of “justice” and a just monarch. Hamilton’s 
lamentations of a fictional rift are dramatized in the division between the moral and the 
historical allegories, which leaves much of feminist and gender theory on the margins of 
scholarship—made singular in the first and dismissed in the second.  
This thesis attempts to fold gender criticism into the allegory of justice in order to 
complicate the rather narrow readings of Spenser’s moral allegories, which would laud 
Britomart and Mercilla as savior and perfect queen and dismiss figures such as Radigund and 
Duessa as mere villainesses and enemies to virtue. I argue that such narrow type-castings are 
far too rigid and ignore the complexities of Spenser’s allegory. In arguing for such 
complication, I do not mean to imply that readers should approach Spenser’s conservative 
allegory as evidence of the author’s radicalism; however, I claim that Spenser’s depictions of 
justice as executed by Britomart and Mercilla upon the malefactors Radigund and Duessa, 
respectively, represent a particular early modern anxiety about the administration of justice 
by and upon feminine bodies.  
 Specifically, Radigund and Duessa evoke pity from the male characters who are 
tasked with administering justice onto the feminine object. Throughout the work, Artegall’s 
quest requires that he “restore originary justice” (Eggert 272), but the major episodes of 
Book V both sideline Artegall in the moments of the allegory that the Knight of Justice must 
act upon feminine bodies. These bodies evoke pity rather than pure Aristotelian justice 
typical of the male justicer tasked with executing order. Struck by the beauty of the 
malefactors, the male justicers’ pity promptly moves them from male action and authority to 
feminized inaction and subordination. While the effects of such passivity are made relatively 
benign in the Munera episode when Artegall is paralyzed by Munera’s weeping, Radigund, 
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the Amazonian warrior who usurps male dominion and imprisons Artegall, and Duessa, the 
duplicitous villainess whose crimes range from false religion, usurpation, lechery, adultery, 
and fraud, who stands trial in the court of Mercilla, represent more distinct problems for 
justice. In the former, Artegall is awestruck by the Amazon’s beauty, which paralyzes the 
Knight of Justice, while in the latter, he must similarly rise to action by submitting himself to 
the tutelage of the perfect monarch.4 Artegall falls prey to pity, on the one hand, and cruelty 
on the other, demonstrating the particular danger of pity and scorn and their effects, which 
are transferrable from the feminine object onto the masculine subject. 
 When Spenser engages pity as an impediment to justice, he seems to set Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, one of his primary sources for The Faerie Queene, beside Seneca’s De 
Clementia to marry the two related virtues of justice and mercy. Seneca overtly criticizes 
pity, opposing it to true wisdom: “the wise man does not show pity” (2.5.2), which Seneca 
claims is a weakness of the mind that serves to only blind the wise to reality. For Seneca, pity 
is particularly dangerous in that it is infectious and can spread among the susceptible in that 
only wise men are immune to its effects. Seneca pointedly juxtaposes the wise and virtuous 
men with weak and pitiful women, writing that “all good men will display clemency and 
gentleness,” but not pity “for it is the failing of a weak nature that old women and wretched 
females [anus et milicerculae] who are moved by the tears of the wickedest criminals, who, if 
they could, would break open their prison” (2.5.3). The vice of pity, according to John 
Staines, is made by Seneca “a specifically feminine vice, the mark of a degenerate, 
                                                          
4 This is evidenced by the swiftness with which less than attractive male characters are handled by the 
Knight of Justice, such as the giant of Book V Canto II who is “shouldered from off the higher ground / And 
down the rock him throwing, in the sea” to drown by Talus (Spenser 49.8-9). Artegall fails to even put forward 
a reaction to the violent death of the giant at the hands of the rigorous enactor of justice, Talus. Conversely, 
however, when Radigund overtakes Artegall in battle, even the robotic Talus is unable to act, and he instead 
flees the scene. 
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effeminate passive mind” (134). For Staines, however, such feminine pity must be countered 
by masculine authority, which he reads as reaching its culmination in Book V, “a place in 
which masculine values and powers are not only glorified but take over the poem” (130). 
Yet, such binary opposition has the effect of simplifying the complex moral allegory at stake 
in Spenser’s epic, one that resists such easy configurations. Rather, readers are presented 
with a series of situations in which male authority and action is compromised by pity until it 
finally must be resolved by feminine enactors of justice. Ultimately, when confronted with a 
feminine malefactor, the male justicer must step aside in order for Spenser to eliminate the 
difference of gender entirely: posed with a degenerate feminine body, a feminine justicer 
must act. The removal of this difference equips women with the tools necessary to better 
ward off pity. A female enactor of justice, when seeking to act upon a dissenting woman, is 
not forced to negotiate gender, allowing them to operate with a level of fluidity not possessed 
by their male counterparts. Justice bends to societal gender norms in Artegall’s encounters 
with piteous women. Ordinarily, a male justicer would not be forced to act at all upon a 
feminine body; however, the villainesses of Book V exist as abnormal women, refusing to fit 
into the typical archetypes afforded to female characters in Arthurian romance. As a result, 
early modern justice breaks down, restored only through the employment of feminine 
justicers countering with virtuous opposition. 
The Amazonian Queen and the Knight of Chastity  
The Radigund episode presents readers with an initial look at Artegall’s inability to 
counter appropriately Radigund’s transgressions as a violent usurper, because he is 
immobilized by the disease of the mind Seneca calls pity. The Knight of Justice is 
imprisoned by Radigund following their one-on-one combat. Initially, Artegall defeats 
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Radigund in combat; however, upon removing her helmet, he is awestruck by her beauty, 
pitying her defeated state. In this moment, Radigund capitalizes on Artegall’s hesitation, 
overtaking him and forcing him to serve as her thrall, completing the process of feminization 
begun with Artegall’s pity, dressing him in women’s weeds and forcing him to women’s 
work. Spenser’s probing into the virtue of justice is contingent upon the progression of 
Artegall’s understanding of and his education in the virtue throughout the duration of Book 
V, which is first problematized by inaction to then be transformed into the removal of virtue, 
resulting ultimately in the hiatus of justice. In this interrogation of the virtue of justice, 
Britomart, the crossdressing knight, recuses her prophesized beloved, Artegall. 
 Spenser’s initial description of Radigund confirms the Amazon’s duality—she 
possesses a feminine nature and a masculine appearance—presenting a problem for justice. 
The natural impulse of Artegall, as dictated by Radigund’s outward appearance and her 
usurpation of male power, is to enact the rigorous justice typical to the knight at this juncture 
of his quest. However, this is complicated by her femininity, which has the effect of evoking 
pity. This feminine aspect of Radigund is highlighted in Spenser’s description of the 
Amazon, which dwells on her body with the male gaze of the speaker seemingly indulging 
her sensuality. The assessments of her garb and the body that lies beneath, suggest an 
appraisal of sexual viability occurring within the mind of the speaker that is then passed on to 
the reader and Artegall. Of this phenomenon, John Berger writes that “men survey women 
before treating them:’ a treatment is dependent upon “how a woman appears to a man” (46). 
Thus, prior to the battle, Spenser’s Radigund approaches Artegall as a powerful monarch, a 
posture that physically juxtaposes masculine power with feminine beauty. In this description, 
Radigund is portrayed as a vexation that is neither masculine enough to warrant strictness in 
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Seneca’s model nor womanly enough to warrant pardon. Instead, the Amazon queen 
becomes a hybrid, designed to misconstrue truth and obstruct justice. This is done, in part, 
through her physical appearance that contains elements that are both masculine and feminine, 
as well as through her actions that have allowed her to occupy her throne. Her description 
promotes her physicality, prefiguring what will ultimately elicit Artegall’s downfall by 
associating her with a kind of dangerous and seductive femininity: 
All in a Camis light of purple silke 
Wouen vppon with siluer, subtly wrought,  
And quilted vppon sattin white as milke,  
Trayled with ribbands diuersly distraught 
Like as the workman had their courses taught;  
Which was short tucked for light motion 
Vp to her ham, but when she list, it raught 
Downe to her lowest heele, and thereupon 
She wore for her defence a mayled habergeon (V. v. 2.1-9).  
Radigund’s attire associates her with the highly sexualized imagery of both spiritual and 
martial threat. Hamilton notes in his annotations of The Faerie Queene that, “Radigund’s 
camis is purple (Lat. purpurea, crimson), creating a garment that is actually a strong red 
color, inclining to purple (539)5. Such coloring likens her to the whore of Babylon, an 
                                                          
5 Radigund is depicted as aspiring toward sovereignty in her garb, but the description more closely 
aligns her to Duessa, another fraudulent monarch who was given “gold and purple pall to weare” (I. vii. 16.3). 
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emblem of Catholicism for Spenser, who was also arrayed in hues of purple and red.6 
Gerhardt Schuette writes that “by the time Spenser wrote The Faerie Queene, the Whore of 
Babylon had become a popular biblical symbol for Protestants to use to refer to the Church of 
Rome” (111). S.K. Heniger elaborates on this assertion, adding that, originally, St. John’s 
Apocalypse functioned to “encourage Christians in their resistance against their primary 
religious enemy at the time of its writing (the pagan and powerful Rome)” (179). He furthers 
this argument, adding that it eventually evolved “to refer to current events for Spenser’s 
contemporaries who saw Babylon as the Roman Catholic Church” (179). Similarly, 
Radigund serves as an emblem of false sovereignty, royal only in appearance but not in 
actuality. Likewise, her suit of armor is revealing and sexually charged: it is short enough to 
allow her freedom of movement but also dramatizes the threat of her powerful and 
transgressive femininity. John Adams asserts that, of the cross-dressing characters in the 
work, “Radigund’s armour is far more sensually characterized” (21). In this way, the sensual 
language used to describe Radigund places a repeated “emphasis on the body underneath her 
armour” (Adams 21). The armor becomes an outward display of her usurped power rather 
than a cleverly-crafted disguise to protect her identity.  Radigund repurposes the intentional 
use of armor—defensive protection—transforming it into a physically tangible exhibition of 
her offensive and powerful prowess. Additionally, her garb goes as far as to accentuate her 
feminine features, highlighting her feminine sexuality. Once on her body, even armor 
becomes feminized. 
                                                          
 
6 Based on Revelations 17.3-5: “I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet colored beast, full of names of 
blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns. And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet color, and 
decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and 
filthiness of her fornication: And upon her forehead was a name written, MYSTERY, BABYLON THE 
GREAT, THE MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH.” 
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 Spenser’s language is indebted to the emblem tradition of Cesare Ripa, who in 
Iconologia includes a portrait of injustice that Spenser uses to describe Radigund in abjectly 
sexual terms. Spenser goes to great lengths to align Radigund with all enemies of the true 
Protestant religion, both Catholics and Muslims who would stand opposed to Artegall’s 
action as the Knight of Justice, and yet the description of Radigund repeatedly hovers over 
the Amazon’s body. The subversive portrait of Radigund culminates in the poet’s inverted 
blazon cataloguing the Amazonian’s beauty in a rhetorical move that confuses the martial 










In Spenser’s skillful hands, this emblem is overtly sexualized, the poet describing Radigund 
that melds physical threat and sexual attraction: 
                                                          
7 Iconologia was a highly influential emblem book based on Egyptian, Greek, and Roman emblematic 
representations written by Italian iconographer Cesare Ripa. Of Injustice, Ripa writes: “The personification of 
Injustice is a tall woman of commanding appearance, wearing a helmet and a rich robe. Her white cloak is 
spattered with blood, and she holds a blood-stained scimitar in one hand. The curving scimitar symbolizes 
twisted justice” (117). 




And on her legs she painted buskins wore,  
Basted with bends of gold on euery side,  
And mailes betweene, and laced close afore:  
Vppon her thigh her Cemitare was tide,  
With an embrodered belt of mickell pride; (V. v. 3.1-5). 
Traditionally utilized to anatomize the body of an unrequited love object, the blazon here 
heralds “Injustice.” Mirroring the transgressive nature of the blazons written by John Donne 
and Thomas Nashe, the subject is sensual; Hannah Betts writes that the blazon commonly 
traded in “sexual explicitness,” repurposing poetry into “a vehicle for an exposé of the 
female body” (168). As the description of Radigund travels, untraditionally, up her body 
rather than from the seat of reason down, the mechanics of the blazon are inverted, turning 
them sinister and simultaneously highlighting Radigund’s sensuality to culminate in the 
Amazon’s “phallus,” her scimitar, or a curved sword, attached to her thigh, a weapon overtly 
associated with pagan infidels.8 In addition to its shape, the placement of her weapon is 
noteworthy. Her sword of injustice is tied upon her thigh and is unsheathed. Historically, 
swords have served to symbolize power, authority, and strength as a phallic symbol. David 
Van Meter writes that “in literature, the sword assumes a cognate sense of masculinity and 
social power, just as the phallus serves to strengthen the biological structure of society” 
(178). By arming Radigund with an exposed blade, Spenser’s Amazon warrior is lent a false 
                                                          
8 In the book Sword and Scimitar: Fourteen Centuries of War between Islam and the West, by 
Raymond Ibrahim, the scimitar is the weapon of choice for the Muslim soldiers. However, in such context, the 




phallus that serves to represent her imitation of a masculine knight. Importantly, her phallus 
is only temporarily attached to her body, mirroring the illegitimacy of her power.  
 Spenser symbolically opposes Radigund to Artegall in his description of her shield 
which is associated with the full moon, a symbol antithetical to Artegall’s repeated 
association with the sun.9 Describing her shield: “As the faire Moone in her most full aspect, 
/ that to the Moone it mote be like in each respect,” Spenser turns to a symbol of inconstancy 
(V. v 3.7-10).10 Spenser’s juxtaposition of the sun and the moon serves a dual-purpose. On 
the one hand, it associates Artegall with the glory and goodness of the sun, which, according 
to Aptekar, aligns him with positive figures of justice in Book V that all “resemble or [are] 
symbolized by the sun,” which is considered to be one “of the true representations of justice” 
(71). However, in this particular instance, Artegall is associated with the setting sun, 
suggesting that the Knight of Justice is waning, and will soon be replaced by the lunar 
Radigund. Radigund’s shield depicts the moon during its most powerful phase, a description 
that endows the Amazonian warrior with the authority to act as a challenge to Artegall. 
 Throughout the battle itself, Radigund and Artegall dramatize Seneca’s model of pity 
and strictness, negotiating the moral allegory of justice through their traded blows. Radigund 
is framed as an unmitigated opponent to Artegall not only symbolically but also in behavior; 
the Amazonian warrior is associated with abject rage during her fight with Artegall, who is 
characterized initially by a virtuous temperance.  Allegorically, through the battle between 
                                                          
               9 “Till euening, that the Sunne gan downward bend. / Then rushed forth out of the thickest rout” IV. iv. 
43.6-7. 
 
10 Spenser breaks from historical accuracy when describing the Amazonian Radigund’s shield with its 
full moon shape. Aptekar briefly touches on this difference, arguing that “like the Amazons in the Greek stories, 
Radigund carries a moon-like shield. Though theirs, to be sure, were in the shape of half moons; Radigund’s is 
like a full moon” (176). This difference that Aptekar highlights but does not elaborate on, is a logical choice 
operating at the plot level. The increased size of her shield allows Radigund to counter Artegall’s attacks. 
19 
 
Artegall and Radigund, Spenser works to contrast the virtue of the former with the vice of the 
latter, but such an allegory ultimately fails when Artegall is confronted with Radigund’s 
particular combination of beauty and vice, demonstrating the problem of pity in the execution 
of justice. At first, the allegorical fight is largely typical: the virtue of temperance is able to 
withstand the vice of rage: 
She at first encounter on him ran 
With furious rage, as if she had intended  
Out of his breast the very heart haue rended: 
But he that had like tempests often tride,  
From that first flaw him selfe right well defended.  
The more she rag’d, the more he did abide; 
She hewed, she foynd, she lasht, she laid on euery side. (V. v. 6.3-9). 
Throughout the battle, Artegall maintains the upper hand not through force, but through 
patience, a virtue which risks associating Artegall with a less active virtue and casting the 
Knight of Justice as passive in his fight against Radigund. The fight turns on Artegall’s 
movement from action to inaction in response to Radigund’s ferocity: 
Yet still her blowes he bore, and her forbore, 
Weening at last to win advantage new; 
Yet still her crueltie increased more, 
And though powre faild, her courage did accrew,  
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Which fayling he gan fiercely her pursew. (V. v. 7.1-5)  
Spenser’s language turns here, transferring Radigund’s cruelty and rage—virtues opposed to 
mercy and justice by Seneca—directly to the Knight of Justice, who initially absorbs the 
Amazon’s rage with forbearance and temperance, which are then revised to “fierce” at the 
fight’s volta. From this point on, until the culmination of the battle and the disarming of 
Radigund, Artegall is re-characterized by rage and action, assuming his masculine authority 
over the Amazonian woman, who he lays into with blows Spenser likens to that of a 
blacksmith at the anvil. Radigund can only defend herself with her mighty shield until it too 
succumbs to Artegall’s blows, being sliced in half by the Knight of Justice’s passionate 
attack. When she attacks again, she wounds Artegall in the thigh, a symbolic wound that 
simultaneously characterizes the lust Radigund may inspire in Artegall and also threatens 
him with a kind of castration. Artegall responds in kind and with masculine indignation, 
smiting Radigund on the helmet and winning the chivalric battle. 
 While strictness and cruelty characterize their fight, pity enters Artegall once 
Radigund’s femininity is revealed. It is evident that, physically, Artegall is capable of 
winning the battle; however, mentally and emotionally, he is unable to end the life of his 
opponent because he is overcome with pity for Radigund immediately upon disarming her, as 
he “lept with deadly dreadfull looke” to disarm Radigund, removing the “sunshynie helmet” 
which cover her beauty, (11.8-9) “a miracle of natures goodly grace…bath’d in bloud and 
sweat together” (12.3-5). As Artegall looms over the disarmed warrior, he is awestruck and 
no longer sees Radigund as an adversary but as a beautiful woman. Ultimately, the subduing 
of Radigund serves to both emotionally and mentally disarm not the Amazon, but Artegall. 
At her reveal, Spenser revisits the lunar language of her shield to describe all of Radigund: 
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“Like as the Moone in foggie winters night, / Doth seeme to be her selfe though darkned be 
her light” (V. v. 12.8-9). Seeing the bloodied face of the now visually female Radigund, 
Artegall casts his sword away “with pittiful regard” (V. v. 13.2). The revealed femininity of 
his opponent produces pity in her prosecutor. The Knight of Justice, by regarding Radigund 
as pitiful, exchanges a sound mind for a tender heart, traversing down the slippery slope of 
which Seneca forewarned. 
 Artegall here exchanges the rigorous justice he has employed throughout the duration 
of his quest with feminizing pity, which moves the Knight of Justice from a posture of action 
to one of passivity. Radigund, lacking a moral compass possessed by Artegall, 
opportunistically regroups, her cruelty galvanized by her opponent’s hesitation. What Seneca 
would term “strictness” is evidenced by Radigund’s cruelty and utter lack of mercy even 
after Artegall’s concession: 
Soone as the knight she there by her did spy,  
 Standing with emptie hands all weaponlesse,  
 With fresh assault vpon him she did fly, 
 And gan renew her former cruelnesse: 
 And though he still retyr’d, yet nathelesse 
 With huge redoubled strokes she on him layd;  
 And more increast her outrage mercilesse,  
 The more that he with meeke intreatie prayd,  
 Her wrathful hand from greedy vengeance to haue stayd. (V. v. 14). 
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Embodying the forcefulness of the Iron Age and the feminine strength of the full moon, 
Radigund ceaselessly attacks Artegall until the Knight of Justice is left completely 
defeated.11 Decidedly, Radigund exists as a subversive embodiment of virtu, which by 
definition and etymology is typified by aggressive masculine rage (Frye 14). Radigund 
repurposes virtu and transfers the masculine authority granted to such actors from Artegall to 
herself. 
 Artegall’s defeat at the hands of Radigund serves to forewarn readers of the danger of 
pity, highlighting Artegall’s insufficiency in his understanding of justice at this juncture of 
his quest. Radigund exists as a preliminary test, which Artegall must initially fail in order to 
prepare for the upcoming trial of Duessa, which he passes, signifying the maturation of his 
understanding of the virtue of justice. Here, at the halfway point of Artegall’s quest, he is yet 
unable to deliver justice. Numerous critics, such as Brian Lockey, have read the Radigund 
episode as indicating “Artegall’s inability to apply equity in a way that would not involve his 
own personal desires,” equating the Knight of Justice with lust by concentrating upon the 
symbolic wound he receives from Radigund (57). Similarly, many critics associate Radigund 
with Mary Stuart, reading the battle and enslavement of Artegall as a topical allegory for 
what may have been Elizabeth’s greatest threat. Nicholas Knight and K.J Kesselring observe 
                                                          
11 The opposing combatants, again, are allegorized as the Golden Age and the Iron Age by Artegall 
and Radigund, respectively. In this moral allegory, Artegall represents what Harry Levin calls the “nostalgia for 
a happier day,” while Radigund symbolizes “an implicit critique of nowadays” (5).  Of the Golden Age, Spenser 
writes:”Ne then of guile had made experiment, /But voide of vile and treacherous intent, / Held vertue for it self 
in soveraine awe: (IV. viii. 30.3-5).  The Golden Age was a time of perfect justice, completely devoid of force 
and fraud, which pervade that of the Iron Age. As a result, the Golden Age does not require pity. Ripa, through 
explication of his emblem for the Iron Age presents a stark contrast to the description of the Golden Age. The 
Iron Age depicts an armed woman of terrible appearance donning iron garments. Atop her head she wears a 
jeweled helmet. She wields a naked sword in fighting position in one hand, and a large shield in the other. 
Artegall’s reticent approach to the battle could be explained by his link to the Golden Age: he lacks force. 
Conversely, however, Radigund’s brashness in charging straightaway into battle is utterly reflective of the 




that Radigund should not “be strictly associated with Mary,” but rather with “elements of 
pity” (Knight 284) and that “reason prompted the former [mercy, but] emotion the latter 
[pity]” (Kesselring 20). To borrow from Seneca’s rather stoic definition of clemency as a 
virtue that mediated between the two extremes, Artegall is unable to exist in a liminal state 
between the two. His attempt at mercy deteriorates into weak pity, which creates an impasse 
that Artegall, as an enactor of justice, is unable to overcome. In this sense, Artegall becomes 
full of pity after viewing Radigund, who he interprets as pitiful. The contagious nature of 
Seneca’s definition of pity is dramatized as Artegall becomes a host for the vice. His inability 
to negotiate the intricacies of justice is, ultimately, the real reason for Artegall’s downfall and 
his subsequent enslavement.  
 Following his defeat, the Knight of Justice willfully consents to serve Radigund as his 
master: he “to her yielded of his owne accord” (V. v. 17.2).  Some critics read this as a 
testament to Artegall’s temperance as he, instead of actually being defeated by Radigund, 
chooses to be subjected. The literal feminization of the Knight of Justice leads to his eventual 
marginalization in important matters of justice throughout the rest of the book until his 
education in the virtue is complete. Pity, being associated by Seneca with, “a weakness of the 
mind, a loss of rational control over judgement” (2.5.4), impairs the delivery of justice. 
Without sound judgment, it follows that justice can no longer be delivered. It is thus implied 
by Seneca that a ruler or a judge must be a masculine manifestation of both reason and of 
virtue devoid of effeminizing qualities that would compromise the execution of justice. 
Artegall undergoes a process of feminization that hampers his status as not only the Knight 
of Justice but also as a figure of masculine authority at all. Under the rule of Radigund, 
Artegall is stripped of all masculine attributes and in their place is given feminine 
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occupations and characteristics that Spenser associates with the belittlement of the once 
virtuous knight. Spenser laments Artegall’s now low estate in two punctuated lines that act as 
his editorial commentary on Artegall’s descent: “A sordid office for a mind so brave. / So 
hard it is to be a woman’s slave” (V.v.23.4-5). He later overtly condemns the subversive 
gendering of Radigund and the enforced feminization of Artegall, associating such 
demeaning behavior with unchecked feminine power, loosed from the confinement of male 
restraint: 
 Such is the crueltie of womenkynd 
 When they have shaken off the shamefast band, 
 T’obay the heasts of mans well ruling hand, 
 That then all rule and reason they withstand, 
 To purchase licentieous libertie. (25.1-6). 
For Spenser, unchecked femininity is associated with Seneca’s cruelty, its effects upon the 
male slave, a locus of ruth or pity. The current state of Artegall fully embodies the feminine 
pity Seneca warns so clearly of, while the powers that put him into such slavery are 
associated with Senecan strictness. In contrast to such an effeminate portrait of a worthy 
knight stands the masculine embodiment of justice rigorous, Talus. While Artegall passively 
submits to Radigund’s enslavement and the pity that brought him so low, Talus fights 
Radigund’s fellow Amazonian warriors: “he with his yron flaile amongst them thondred, / 
That they were fayne to let him scape away, / Glad from his companie to be so sondred” 
(V.v.19.2-4). Spenser’s “iron man” Talus, who acts as Artegall’s aid throughout the duration 
of his quest, executing malefactors without a second’s hesitation, cannot withstand such 
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unchecked femininity and is forced to flee, seeking out Artegall’s rescue, turning to 
Britomart, the Knight of Chastity and Artegall’s beloved.  
The movement from Artegall to Britomart in Book V shifts the book from the 
masculine to a feminized narrator, unplagued by the pity that seemingly infects masculine 
characters. This marks a decided change in Book V, as the feminine is no longer simply the 
subject of disdain or containment, restrained to the margins of the allegory, but instead takes 
center stage as in Book III. In Radigund’s confused and inverted world, Spenser’s most 
sufficient knight, Britomart, is needed.12 Notably, this canto ends with no definite ending, a 
sharp contrast from the previous cantos of Book V which end in a manner that is decidedly 
final. Artegall remains subservient to Radigund and in bondage, “disarmed quight, / Of all 
the ornaments of knightly name” (V. v. 20.3-4). The text asserts that his release will have to 
be postponed until another time, “which in an other Canto will be best contayned,” 
suggesting that he is immobilized by his pity, and as a result, his fate hangs in the balance 
between two women, Radigund and Britomart respectively (V. v. 57.9). Artegall is 
completely pushed to the margins of the work in this and the following canto in which he is 
not rescued but instead kept, in a state of poetic stagnation or stasis, left with both his sword 
and his masculinity broken. The ensuing cantos following Artegall’s defeat lend the work not 
masculine but feminine authority, which offers a glimpse into Spenser’s apparent anxiety 
regarding dissenting women who refuse to adhere to traditional gender roles. 
 The dilemma of the text, according to Katherine Eggert, “begins to be resolved as 
Book V works its way out of this feminine center,” a process which is confirmed in 
                                                          
12 The ability of Britomart is evidenced by the fact that she is the only knight of a book to not need a 
guide and is capable of demonstrating her allegorical abilities throughout not only her own book, but also in 
order to save her beloved. 
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Britomart’s tenure at the Temple of Isis (275). This particular episode has proven to be a 
critical conundrum for critics trying to navigate their way through Book V. For some, like 
Claire Kinney, the relevancy and the necessity of its inclusion in the episode is challenged 
because it “seems oddly irrelevant to the actual narrative progress of Artegall and his 
automaton-slave Talus” (84). When taking into consideration Artegall’s diminished role at 
this point of the narrative, the Isis Church episode is less “irrelevant” as he no longer serves 
as the book’s focal point. Conversely, however, other critics, like T.K. Dunseath, label 
Britomart’s time at Isis Church as an avenue through which she must travel for rescue and 
restoration: “Once Britomart submits herself to Divine Providence in the Church of Isis, she 
discovers the true nature of her mission and is able to free her lover from woman’s slavery” 
(142).13 Isis Church is the vehicle through which gender roles are remedied, restoring the 
natural order that has been damaged by pity, which “threatens the order of the civic polity” 
(Staines 129). It is within its walls that Britomart is able to repurpose this occurrence, 
harnessing it to use later against Radigund to restore natural order. This restoration occurs as 
“the ambiguous or oscillating gender identities” present both in the temple and the poem’s 
narrative “sort themselves out” (Staines 276). From this point forward, Britomart exhibits 
masculine heroics that she must enforce, yet internalize. Through her time in Isis Church, 
Britomart is able to embody a kind of righteous femininity that can oppose Radigund, one 
that Spenser makes room for in a brief editorial commentary about Artegall’s servitude and 
Radigund’s usurpation of masculine authority. In his earlier condemnation of women who 
have “shaken off the shamefast band” of masculine authority, Spenser hints at the possibility 
that not all women were “borne to base humilitie” and subservience; rather, there is an 
                                                          




exception: “Unlesse the heavens them lift to lawfull soveraintie” (V.v.25.2,8,9). Such 
language obviously positions Queen Elizabeth as the exception to the rule but opens the door 
to other lawful feminine sovereigns as well. Such a sovereign is Britomart. 
 The nature of Britomart’s duel with Radigund differs drastically from that of 
Artegall’s battle with the Amazonian warrior. During their parlay, Radigund outlines the 
same terms given to Artegall, which he had accepted affably.14 Britomart, however, 
indignantly rejects identical terms, as chivalry does not impose preset conditions, instead 
leaving the victor free to offer mercy. Unlike her male counterparts, Britomart is 
unconcerned with mercy, and is instead driven by a need to enact justice at any cost. The 
singular combat between the two is less personalized than that of Radigund and Artegall and 
is also much shorter in duration. As critics like Katherine Eggert have noticed, in Britomart’s 
victory over Radigund, “the two women warriors are scarcely distinguishable” (276). The 
melding of the two women suggest that Britomart’s task is to subdue a sinister mirror image 
of herself with language associating both women with a type of masculine authority formerly 
condemned by Spenser as unnatural. Indeed, Spenser repeatedly emphasizes the “rage” of the 
two women and yet takes pains to remind the reader of the feminine sex of each character: 
Ne either sought the others strokes to shun 
 But through great fury both their skill forgot, 
 And practice use in armes: ne spared not 
 Their dainty parts, which nature had created 




 So faire and tender, without staine or spot, 
 For other uses, then they them translated: 
 Which they now hackt and hewd, as if such use they hated. (V.vii.29.2-9). 
Spenser, as if aghast at the behavior of his lady knights, questions their relationship to their 
own sex and associates them simultaneously with martial skills and childbirth. The double 
business to which both Radigund and Britomart are bound in their duel appears so vexing to 
Spenser that he must allegorize the allegory further, likening the two women to a lion and a 
tiger rather than further grapple with their femininity. In the end, Britomart subdues 
Radigund in a manner that underscores the sense of finality. When justice is to be delivered, 
Britomart is unplagued by any semblance of pity: the “stroke” of her sword “so cruelle 
passage found” on the “shoulder plate” of Radigund that she pierces her helmet (V. vii. 33.1-
2). The brute force of Britomart is displayed as her sword “bit / Vnto the bone, and made a 
griesly wound,” removing the head of the Amazonian queen completely (33.2-3). Her actions 
in combat are characterized by wrath, anger, and revenge for the crimes inflicted upon 
Artegall, rather than mercy, the “wrothfull Britonesse” cast as an agent of masculine 
vengeance (34.1).    
 The removal of Radigund’s head is a fitting mode of execution, the seat of reason 
removed from the body completely. Radigund’s beheading is noted by Eggert, who writes 
that Book V contains a “curious catalogue of ways to abuse the human head,” but that these 
are eventually “cancelled in one stroke” with Britomart’s decapitation of Radigund (277). 
The long catalogue of abused heads indicates that head bashing serves as the most common 
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punishment of usurping authority.15 Maureen Quilligan notes that the original blow to the 
head, followed by complete decapitation are acts that equate to “capital punishment for the 
usurping female ruler” who, against natural order, becomes head of state (169). Spenser 
suggests that the best means of disposing of a dissenting and ambitious woman who has 
ascended to the position of a head of state is an act of decapitation. 
 Following the beheading of Radigund, the narrative itself begins to know where it is 
heading. Though justice is delivered here by a feminine authority, masculinity once again 
rejoins the central narrative of the work, pushing femininity back to the margins: Artegall 
ventures forth once more with the goal of completing his delayed quest, leaving Britomart 
behind. Staines observes that, at this point in Book V, “the general thrust of the narrative, 
moreover, once more sets limits to feminine influence over the masculine aspects of justice” 
(132). This is made possible by Britomart’s decision to return society to its natural, male-
dominated norms. Britomart uses her victory over the Amazons to “be a counterrevolutionary 
against female rule” (133). While Britomart may very well serve as a counterrevolutionary 
figure, she is allowed to remain in Radigund’s former city, ruling “as Princess” because 
Spenser’s Knight of Chastity is benign to the natural order of things. While reigning over the 
city, “the liberty of women [she] did repeale,” giving the long-usurped power back “to mens 
subiection,” as “tru Iustice” would dictate (V. viii. 42.7). If a woman was necessary to 
remove the threat of injustice, it would naturally follow that a woman would be necessary to 
restore the just order of the patriarchy. Thus, Spenser presents his readers with an allegory 
that makes the feminine enactors of justice co-opt certain masculine elements of justice 
                                                          
15 For a complete list, note the decapitated lady of 1.18, Pollenete’s “groome of euille guize,” of 2.6, 
and the bare-headed Terpine, whom Radigund “smites on his head-peece” who is hanged, not by his neck, but 
“by the hed” by the Amazons (4.22, 4.40, and 5.18). 
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without becoming masculine themselves. This co-option is understood always to be 
temporary, as in the case of Britomart, who is allowed to reign ephemerally and 
unthreateningly. To frame the argument in another way, Staines writes that “force and guile 
of masculine justice must constrain feminine equity and mercy” (135). It is for this reason 
that Britomart, following the restoration of a male-dominated society, disappears from the 
poem, while Artegall continues his quest, allowing Spenser to dispel pity as a threat to justice 
that is particularly effeminizing. 
The Guileful Hag and the Merciful Queen 
In Queen Mercilla’s trial and subsequent execution of Duessa in Book V of The 
Faerie Queene, the queen’s courtroom becomes another arena in which masculine power and 
its response of pity is sidelined by Spenser in favor of feminine enactors of justice as well as 
a topical allegory for the trial of Mary Queen of Scots. Duessa, appears before the court with 
“titles of nobilitie defeace[d]” (V. ix. 38.4-7), facing judgment for her “many haynous 
crymes” (39.6). In a recapitulated allegory of Seneca’s De Clementia, the trial of Duessa 
juxtaposes Seneca’s vice of cruelty, embodied by Zele, and Pittie, who argues for the 
mitigation of Duessa’s punishment. Queen Mercilla serves as Spenser’s pièce de résistance 
of a feminine enactor of justice, perfectly able to negotiate the intricacies of justice, 
reconciling scorn with mercy and, unimpaired by pity, one ultimately able to sentence 
Duessa to death. 
While Radigund operated in a manner of physical force, the duplicitous Duessa, as 
her name suggests, relies heavily upon her skills at deception, particularly her ability to 
disguise her foulness and vice in favor of a pleasing façade that serves primarily to evoke 
pity from the many men who view her as a damsel and attempt to “rescue” her throughout 
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The Faerie Queene. However, in Book V, Duessa’s façade falls away, as she appears before 
the reader “as a prisoner” (ix 38.1). Even in her captive state, however, Duessa possesses a 
tarnished attractiveness: appearing with “rare beautie in her face, / But blotted with condition 
vile and base” (ix 38.4-5). The current physical appearance of Duessa, with her outward 
beauty waning, presents a sharp contrast to the initial introduction the reader is given to 
Duessa. 
 Mirroring Radigund, Duessa is first introduced in a magnificent manner. True to her 
name, the devious Duessa enters the narrative masquerading as Fidessa, who is described as a 
site of both majesty and pity. Spenser initially describes her majesty in terms that associate 
her with the trappings of royalty but little of its substance:  
 A goodly Lady clad in scarlot red, 
 Purfled with gold and pearle of rich assay,  
 And like a Persian mitre on her hed 
 Shee wore, with crowns and owches garnished, 
 The which her lauish louers to her gaue;  
 Her wanton palfrey all was ouerspred  
 With tinsell trappings, wouen like a waue,  
 Whose bridle rung with golden bels and bosse braue. (I. ii. 13). 
The monarchial garb of Duessa is similar to that of Radigund in that she is associated with a 
kind of sexualized usurped majesty that alludes to the whore of Babylon. While she is 
described initially as a “goodly Lady,” it is understood to be used ironically by Spenser in 
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order to suggest that Duessa is only good in appearance “seeming [like a] glorious show” (I. 
ii. 21.5). Similarly, Duessa also repeatedly becomes a site of alleged pity, but only pitiful in 
appearance, not in actuality. Dressed in a manner to overtly evoke the whore of Babylon with 
scarlet robes, precious stones, and pearls, Duessa is presented as a false image of royalty and 
beauty.16 Unlike Una, her allegorical opposition, Duessa is openly sexualized, evidenced by 
her Babylonian headgear which she receives as gifts from her lavish lovers.17 Through our 
initial introduction to Duessa, her status as a seductress is apparent. However, once she is 
thrust into the courtroom of Mercilla in Book V, the truth is laid bare, which results first in 
the evocation of pity, and then in the deliverance of justice. 
 Duessa’s appearance throughout the allegory is indebted to Ripa’s iconography of 
fraud, a vice with which Duessa is repeatedly associated. Aptekar overtly links the two, 
observing that “Duessa’s name defines her duality—the essentially twofold nature of guile” 
(143). As the vice of pity itself is fraudulent, it naturally follows that Spenser would align 
Duessa with such an emblem. Ripa describes his emblem of fraude as: 
A Woman with two Faces, one young, the other old; Feet like Eagles Talons; a Tail 
like a Scorpion, two Hearts in her right Hand, and a Mask in her left. The two faces 
denote Fraud and Deceit, ever pretending well: The two Hearts, the two 
Appearances; the Mask, that Fraud makes things appear otherwise than they are; the 
Scorpion, and Eagle, the bale Defignes, and Discord they foment, like Birds of Prey, 
to rob Men of their Goods or Honour. (30).   
                                                          
16 See Revelations 17.4. 











       Figure 3. Fraud from Ripa’s Iconologia.  
Duessa has two heads, so to speak, and is quite proficient in the art of masquerading as a 
goodly lady by donning pleasing and magnificent garments, extending to her the appearance 
of a beautiful and young woman, her posture typically that of a distressed maiden in need of 
rescue. However, beneath the façade, Spenser reveals that Duessa is quite monstrous, a sight 
of distrust and aversion rather than pity. Her true form is only visible when she is bathing 
alone, subject to no male gaze but that of the poem’s speaker, who is immediately disgusted 
and full of scorn:   
 Bathing her selfe in origane and thyme:  
 A filthy foule old woman I did vew,  




 Her neather partes misshapen, monstruous,  
 Were hidde in water, that I could not see,  
 But they did seeme more foule and hideous,  
 Than womans shape man would beleeue to bee. (I. ii. 40-41). 
One of her feet mirrors the depiction of Ripa’s fraude, an eagle’s talon, while the other is an 
uneven paw of a bear, which according to Aptekar, serves as “a symbol of asymmetry and 
irregularity” (143). Her tail, however, breaks with traditional iconography, as Spenser lends 
Duessa the fraudulently fitting tail of a fox. Her “neather partes,” a fitting locus for the 
speaker’s scorn of such monstrous femininity, are deformed and appalling. The speaker’s 
scorn here is positioned as a natural response to such disfigurement as a result of Duessa’s 
vice, his judgment a just rendering of Duessa’s monstrosity. 
In the courtroom, however, Duessa adapts a posture overtly associated with pity, 
maintaining an appearance as a “wretched semblant,” which garners “the peoples great 
compassion” (V. ix. 38.8-9). The deceptive employment of pity is utilized as an effeminate 
strategy by Duessa, who attempts to capitalize on her appearance of weakness to evoke the 
pity of the trial’s spectators. Staines observes that Spenser’s language of supplication— 
“semblant”—reminds his reader that “the pitiful can be a performance” (135), divorced from 
reality. Supplication acts as an overt demand on pity. However, unlike mercy, which is 
dictated by reason, supplication relies on compassion alone. Duessa’s duplicity is evident in 
this performance, as she appears as a distorted manifestation of mercy, falsely demanding 
compassion with the goal of evoking pity. 
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 To defeat Duessa’s performance of pity, Spenser employs Zele, a representation of 
Seneca’s vice of cruelty, who serves as a prosecutor with the chief goal of dismantling the 
façade of Duessa, publicly accusing her of “many haynous crimes,” listing “pittie” among 
her list of charges (V. ix. 39.8). However, Zele does not exist as a paragon of absolute 
justice. Instead, the persecutor is manifested as strictness, the allegorical antithesis to pity. 
When faced with his own allegorical opposition, in the form of “Pittie, with full tender heart” 
(V. ix. 45.3), Zele is made less sufficient, strictness bending to pity. This is evidenced as 
Pittie is successful in winning over Arthur, who Spenser describes in the same terms, having 
himself a “tender hart…sore empassionate” (46.1-2). As Arthur looks upon the apparently 
pitiful Duessa, his “courage gan relent” (46.6). In this instance, Spenser juxtaposes the 
effeminizing and passive nature of pity with the masculine and active impulses of courage. 
Arthur, the sufficient knight who will become the most famous and virtuous king of the 
Britons, immediately collapses his masculine authority—here put in terms of “courage” or 
masculine heart—to the effeminizing force of pity. Here, Spenser is referring to the 
defenders of Mary Stuart, notably the Bishop of Ross who, in 1569, approached “Elizabeth 
and complained of the libels” made against the Queen of Scots (Neill 198).18  Artegall, 
however, unlike Arthur, remains steadfast “with constant firme intent,” a paragon of 
masculine virility and power (49.4). This illustrates the maturation of Artegall’s education in 
the virtue of justice, as he is no longer plagued by pity. Zele, however, doubles down on his 
persecution of Duessa following the testimony of “Pittie,” eventually winning over Arthur by 
                                                          
18 The Bishop of Ross published a defense of the Scottish queen: A Defence of the Honour of the right 
highe, mighty and noble Princess Marie Queene of Scotlande and Dowager of France, with a Declaration as 
well of her Right, Title and Intereste to the Succession of the Crown of Englande, as that the Regimente of 




countering the image of Pittie with that of Ate. Zele’s argument directly takes on the 
assumptions that underwrite pity, with strictness observing that Duessa is far from helpless. 
Staines writes that the hag, Ate, who was conjured earlier by Duessa has “long been a sort of 
disorder” (135). This is drawn from Spenser’s description of Duessa in which she is “glad of 
spoyle and ruinous decay” (V. ix. 47.4). In this depiction, Duessa is aligned more overtly 
with Seneca’s assertion that pity is a diseased vice that can spread if left unchecked.  It is not 
the prosecution, led by Zele, that actually results in Duessa being “brought to her sad doome” 
(V. ix. 42.9), but rather the character witness of Ate, the embodiment of chaos. In an attempt 
to closely align the sinner with the sin, Zele calls upon Ate to witness against Duessa. On the 
one hand, having conjured the spirit from hell herself, Duessa places herself in a position to 
be condemned by Ate. On the other, however, Zele’s eagerness to prove Duessa’s guilt, 
specifically his choice of witness, “paradoxically aligns [him] with the very crimes he seeks 
to condemn” (Kaplan 41). His strong verbal onslaught is able to banish any remorse that the 
spectators of the trial may be inclined to feel for the fallen hag, Ate actually taints the 
prosecution’s moral high ground. This has the twofold effect of complicating a reading of 
Duessa that results in thoughtless conviction, as well as diminishing the credibility of Zele as 
an unbiased enactor of justice. Ultimately, Zele, as the embodiment of scorn highlights the 
problem of attempting to deliver justice when guided by the opposite extreme, cruelty. 
 Critics, seemingly following from Spenser’s own discomfort with scorn and 
strictness, have likewise pointed out the callous nature of Zele’s arraignment of Duessa. In 
cataloguing the laundry list of charges brought against Duessa, Zele functions as too 
“rigorous…of a representation of the letter of the law,” according to Knight (287). Abraham 
Stoll likewise echoes this lament, adding that Zele exists as “too strict of an allegorical 
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personification in Mercilla’s court” (202). This recurring trend in scholarship recapitulates 
the very notions of Spenser’s own discomfort with force being applied to feminine bodies. 
Those who are weak, or appear to be weak, naturally evoke pity, even in literary scholars. As 
a result, scorning the already downtrodden is a double affront to readers’ own levels of 
comfort.  
Despite the strong indictment of Duessa by Zele, Mercilla displays her own 
reservations in exactly how to hand the guileful hag and the canto ends with the queen in 
tears, her “Princely breasts…touched nere / With piteous ruth” but with no action taken 
(50.1-2). Spenser’s “piteous ruth” engages the apparent tensions between justice and mercy 
in the scene. Mercilla, like Queen Elizabeth, is forced to strike the perfect balance between 
mercy and pity, while still executing justice. The “Gender” entry of The Spenser 
Encyclopedia, presents readers with the notion that “Spenser attempted to envision a moral 
structure that could integrate the two realms, [male and female], without undermining the 
sexual-political structure of society, to create a morality that could heal the split between 
private virtue and public power” (Hamilton 325). This endeavor is complicated by justice, 
which Aristotle lauds as “a perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue…because 
its possessor can practise his virtue towards others and not merely himself” (V. i. 15). Pity 
should only be practiced as a private virtue, for Spenser, whereas mercy, conversely, is a 
public property and power. Both Mercilla and Elizabeth are forced to navigate between these 
two realms—the public and the private. Mercilla’s own public performance is rather 
ambiguous, as Duessa is executed between cantos. The legitimacy of the nature of Mercilla’s 
tears are thereby called into question, as Staines writes that they are no more than “cover for 
the Stoic decision to punish” (135). Knight echoes this, adding that “Mercilla’s tears are, 
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overall, ineffectual” (287). However, this dismissal of the benign nature of Mercilla does not 
take into account how the queen co-opts the liminal space between the queen’s two bodies 
that is afforded to the early modern sovereign through the King’s Two Bodies, which was “a 
distinctive feature of English political thought in the age of Elizabeth and the early Stuarts” 
(Kantorowicz 42). In short, her outward display of sadness illustrates her struggle as a public 
enactor of justice.  
In the end, Mercilla is just and chooses the option that is best for the realm, while 
refraining from scorning Duessa as rigorously as Zele or Artegall or pitying excessively like 
Arthur. Neil writes that as a result of the danger posed by Duessa, “it was necessary that the 
claims of justice should supersede policies of mercy” (212). Spenser’s view mirrors the 
accepted defense of the English government, under which the House of Commons charged 
Mary in 1572: 
The late Scottish Queen hath heaped up together all the sins of the Licentious Sons of 
David, Adulteries, Murders, Conspiracies, Treasons, and Blasphemies against God; 
and if she escape with small punishment, her Majesty in Conscience ought, as also 
good and faithful Subjects to fear that God will reserve her as an Instrument to put her 
from the Royal Seat of this Kingdom, and to plague the unthankful and naughty. 
(Qtd. In D’Ewes 204).  
Neill observes that “the same view can be found in nearly all of the writings against Mary in 
the last phase of the battle of the books” (213). As her name suggests, Mercilla is not only the 
allegorical representation of Seneca’s clemency, the balanced mediation between the 
extremities of pity and strictness, but also the representation of monarchial power as 
demonstrated in royal iconography and the rich emblem tradition of early modern England, 
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of which Aptekar writes “the popularity and the widespread circulation of emblem literature 
in the sixteenth century is well known and a commonplace” (3). In Ripa’s Iconologia, as 
shown in Figure 4 below, Clemency sits on a lion, holding a spear in one hand and una saetta 
in the other.19 Although the lion, itself a symbol of royal clemency, can easily overpower 
men, it does not harm without reason. Spenser’s Mercilla mirrors such iconography: she 
holds “a Scepter in her royall hand,” seated upon a throne, and at her feet, “An huge great 
Lyon lay” collared and chained (V. ix. 30, 33). Mercilla sits above the chained lion to 
illustrate her power and control of the hostile force. While she possesses the brute force of 
the lion, as the embodiment of clemency and mercy, she refrains from releasing it from 
bondage. Just so she reconciles her own internal struggle between pity and strictness. 
Mercilla avoids the common pitfall of pity in that, as Knight observes, “pity [has the effect of 
making] authority worthless,” (281). 
 
                                                          




Figure 4: Clemency from Ripa’s Iconologia. 
 Mercilla’s dual personae—public magistrate and embodiment of mercy—renders the 
queen unable to side fully with the prosecutor Zele but also incapable of extending any form 
of tangible mercy to Duessa. To negotiate these seemingly contradictory impulses, Spenser 
reminds readers that Mercilla’s status as an early modern monarch affords her two persons: 
that of the body natural and the body politic. Through the doctrine of the king’s two bodies, 
monarchs, like Mercilla, “exist as dual selves” (Kantorowicz 19). This dichotomous division 
of the body consists of the body natural and the body politic. As a result, the monarch may 
possess a weak, earthly body; however, they also have a body politic that is strong, and even 
eternal. Despite the decrepit and always decaying state of their body natural, the monarch’s 
body politic is, according to Tudor jurist Edmund Plowden, “devoid of Infancy and Old Age, 
and other natural Defects and imbecilities” (213). More specifically for Spenser, the doctrine 
of the king’s two bodies, to quote Queen Elizabeth herself, allows the “weak and feeble body 
of a woman” to occupy the throne. Spenser furthers this doctrine to allow Mercilla an avenue 
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through which she is able to balance pity and scorn successfully. Mary Villeponteaux reads 
Mercilla’s two bodies as becoming that of “her rule and her virtue” (207). 
It is the nature of her unquestioned sovereignty, as divinely-anointed monarch, that 
allows Mercilla to feel a certain level of personal pity for Duessa without falling prey to the 
paralysis that often accompanies the vice, as it does first with Artegall, then with Arthur. 
While Duessa exists, undoubtably, as a site of pity for Mercilla, as a prisoner, the guileful 
hag is no longer viewed as a threat to the realm or to Mercilla’s reign. As a result, Mercilla is 
exempt from scorn. Through her body natural, which is justifiably feminine, Mercilla 
exhibits her personal pity for Duessa, illustrated through the tears that flow down her face but 
do not inhibit her ability or authority to condemn Duessa as a malefactor. Mercilla is able to 
emerge from the trial morally unscathed as her body natural spares her from the cruelty of 
Zele while simultaneously, her body politic remains unblemished by pity.  
 The ambivalent reactions of Mercilla that work to mitigate the scorn and pity at the 
extremes of justice also delay the actual execution of Duessa, which occurs only in the 
background of the work itself. Some critics, like Eggert, argue that the wavering exhibited by 
Mercilla is surprising, especially when considering the book’s “handling of beheadings” 
(282).20 Others, however, like Hamilton in his annotations of The Faerie Queene, assert that 
the time lapse between verdict and execution serves to symbolize Elizabeth’s delay when 
consenting to Mary Queen of Scotts’ execution, writing that “the usual interval between a 
verdict and the sentencing, which is carried out in canto ten, stanza four, is marked by a gap 
of three stanzas,” reflecting the three month gap between Mary’s indictment and execution 
                                                          
20 Eggert argues that this silence on the part of the poem suggests that perhaps Duessa was not in fact 
executed p. 278. 
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(577). In the following canto, it is simply revealed that Duessa had met “her doome,” 
following the judgment of Mercilla which with “strong constraint did her thereto enforce” 
(V. x. 4.3-6). Hamilton notes that “thereto” directly connects the doom of Mercilla to 
Duessa’s beheading without the need for further editorial commentary on the part of the 
speaker: “the loss of Duessa’s seat of reason is deliberately not said, nor need it be” (578). 
Fittingly, as the offenses of Duessa are committed against the state, capital punishment 
through decapitation serves as an appropriate form of punishment. 
 Spenser continues the pattern set in Book V of having feminine forces enact corporal 
justice. As a result, Artegall and Arthur are reduced to spectators, only pupils of the powerful 
and virtuous Mercilla. Despite—or perhaps because of—Artegall’s movement from pity to 
scorn, Spenser’s discomfort with masculine justice being performed on feminine bodies 
remains, preventing Artegall from ever reaching the moral level of Mercilla. It is this 
unwillingness to allow male justicers to enact punishment on dissenting women that 
ultimately hampers the allegory, forcing Spenser to erase gender completely in order to enact 
the version of justice that early moderns viewed as morally righteous.  
Conclusion  
 Throughout Book V, justice is the most comprehensive and heralded moral virtue, 
reflective of Aristotle’s assertion that “In Justice is all Virtue found in sum” (V. i. 13-15). 
The first three books of The Faerie Queene deal with internal virtues; however, the latter 
three books grapple with external virtues, making them intrinsically more difficult to 
navigate through the epic. Spenser’s difficulties with dealing with external virtues, such as 
justice, can be explained by Aristotle’s belief that the virtue is so challenging to master 
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because “there are many who can practice virtue in their own private affairs but cannot do so 
in their relations with another” (V. i. 13-15).  
 If justice is inherently difficult to practice, the addition of gender, specifically when 
male justicers attempt to act upon the bodies of dissenting females, only complicates the 
matter further. Artegall, the Knight of Justice, is according to Judith Anderson, “the most 
disappointing and ineffectual hero of the entire poem” (65) because of this complication.21 In 
the early cantos of the book, Artegall delivers justice that is simplistic, and at times, even 
vengeful.  
As Spenser navigates the turbulences of the virtue, he also engages with his apparent 
anxieties in regard to dissenting women in the form of Radigund and Duessa. In earlier parts 
of the work, male characters are unsure exactly of how best to handle these dissenting 
women. As a result, justice and natural order dissolve into the margins of the work. 
Artegall—the embodiment of justice—is left suspended as a prisoner of Radigund who 
supplants natural order with a matriarchal, misandrist society. 
 As a result, Spenser employs feminine justicers unplagued by pity to carry out the 
execution of justice. The Knight of Chastity from Book III defeats Radigund, the emblem of 
injustice, which has the dual effect of begetting justice and restoring natural order. Spenser’s 
anxieties regarding feminine dissent occur once more in his handling of Duessa, who until 
the end of Book V wreaks havoc without consequence. It is not until Duessa is brought to 
Queen Mercilla that she is forced to pay for her transgressions. Through feminine 
                                                          
21 Anderson’s rebuke of the Knight of Justice may be too critical: Artegall exhibits more growth than 




sovereignty, Spenser is able to offer a more nuanced portrait of justice. By inserting gender 
into the moral allegory, Spenser is able to engage with modes of thought that are associated 
with the politics of early modern England, contextualizing Seneca and Aristotle to deal more 
overtly with the feminine.  
The virtue of justice makes demands that neither the history of mankind nor any 
individual can truly meet. It is for this reason that the two exemplars of justice are allegorical 
women who symbolize abstract and larger-than-life ideals. Britomart exists as the physical 
personification of Britain, and Mercilla, as the material manifestation of Queen Elizabeth’s 
reign as monarch. The thematic progression of Book V is driven by the emergence of 
Britomart as Artegall’s savior, and Mercilla as a symbol of equity and mercy; conversely, 
Radigund and Duessa, as villainesses, exist largely as symbols of false equity and false 
compassion. Male characters, like Artegall and Arthur symbolize justice, governed by the 
examples of feminine sufficiency who act as their tutors. Their education made possible only 
through feminine justicers who must intervene to respond to feminine dissent, confining 
masculinity temporarily to the margins of the work. Unlike previous scholarship, which seeks 
to dismiss gender in Book V, I submit that gender functions as a catalyst that is absolutely 
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